Day 28 of 365: Elephants on the Moon

One can build on yesterday's argument and the implications it has for non-composite phenomena.  These are things that don't arise, abide, and cease.  What might those be?  Space, cessation that is the result of analysis (kleshas for an arhat), and cessation that is not the result of analysis (nonexistence of elephants on the moon).  Anyway, the point here is that by seeing that composite phenomena do not truly exist, one can then see "automatically" that non-composite phenomena do not really exist.  Khenpo gives the example of a car in a dream.  Once you realize the car is in a dream, why would you take the space in the car to be any more real than the car itself?  Given that we sometimes define our experience by what it is not, how does this help to chisel away at the solidity of our reality?